Tyranny of the majority refers to a situation in majority rule where the preferences and interests of the majority may dominate the political landscape, potentially sidelining or disregarding the rights and needs of minority groups. This idea has been discussed by various thinkers, including John Stuart Mill, who explored the implications of such dynamics in his 1859 book On Liberty.[1]
A tyranny of the majority can ensue when democracy is distorted either by an excess of centralization[2] or when the people abandon a wider perspective to "rule upon numbers, not upon rightness or excellence".[3]
In both cases, in the context of a nation, constitutional limits on the powers of a legislative body such as a bill of rights or supermajority clause have been used to counter the problem. A separation of powers (for example legislative and executive majority actions subject to review by the judiciary) may also be implemented to prevent the problem from happening internally in a government.[4]
In social choice, a tyranny-of-the-majority scenario can be formally defined as a situation where the candidate or decision preferred by a majority is greatly inferior (hence "tyranny") to the socially optimal candidate or decision according to some measure of excellence such as total utilitarianism or the egalitarian rule.
The origin of the term "tyranny of the majority" is commonly attributed to Alexis de Tocqueville, who used it in his book Democracy in America. It appears in Part 2 of the book in the title of Chapter 8, "What Moderates the Tyranny of the Majority in the United States' Absence of Administrative Centralization" (fr|De ce qui tempère aux États-Unis la '''tyrannie de la majorité'''[5]) and in the previous chapter in the names of sections such as "The Tyranny of the Majority" and "Effects of the Tyranny of the Majority on American National Character; the Courtier Spirit in the United States".[6]
While the specific phrase "tyranny of the majority" is frequently attributed to various Founding Fathers of the United States, only John Adams is known to have used it, arguing against government by a single unicameral elected body. Writing in defense of the Constitution in March 1788,[7] Adams referred to "a single sovereign assembly, each member…only accountable to his constituents; and the majority of members who have been of one party" as a "tyranny of the majority", attempting to highlight the need instead for "a mixed government, consisting of three branches". Constitutional author James Madison presented a similar idea in Federalist 10, citing the destabilizing effect of "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" on a government, though the essay as a whole focuses on the Constitution's efforts to mitigate factionalism generally.
Later users include Edmund Burke, who wrote in a 1790 letter that "The tyranny of a multitude is a multiplied tyranny."[8] It was further popularised by John Stuart Mill, influenced by Tocqueville, in On Liberty (1859). Friedrich Nietzsche used the phrase in the first sequel to Human, All Too Human (1879).[9] Ayn Rand wrote that individual rights are not subject to a public vote, and that the political function of rights is precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities and "the smallest minority on earth is the individual".[10] In Herbert Marcuse's 1965 essay Repressive Tolerance, he said "tolerance is extended to policies, conditions, and modes of behavior which should not be tolerated because they are impeding, if not destroying, the chances of creating an existence without fear and misery" and that "this sort of tolerance strengthens the tyranny of the majority against which authentic liberals protested".[11] In 1994, legal scholar Lani Guinier used the phrase as the title for a collection of law review articles.[12]
A term used in Classical and Hellenistic Greece for oppressive popular rule was ochlocracy ("mob rule"); tyranny meant rule by one man—whether undesirable or not.
Herbert Spencer, in "The Right to Ignore the State" (1851), pointed the problem with the following example:[13]
See main article: Concurrent majority.
Secession of the Confederate States of America from the United States was anchored by a version of subsidiarity, found within the doctrines of John C. Calhoun. Antebellum South Carolina utilized Calhoun's doctrines in the Old South as public policy, adopted from his theory of concurrent majority. This "localism" strategy was presented as a mechanism to circumvent Calhoun's perceived tyranny of the majority in the United States. Each state presumptively held the Sovereign power to block federal laws that infringed upon states' rights, autonomously. Calhoun's policies directly influenced Southern public policy regarding slavery, and undermined the Supremacy Clause power granted to the federal government. The subsequent creation of the Confederate States of America catalyzed the American Civil War.
19th century concurrent majority theories held logical counterbalances to standard tyranny of the majority harms originating from Antiquity and onward. Essentially, illegitimate or temporary coalitions that held majority volume could disproportionately outweigh and hurt any significant minority, by nature and sheer volume. Calhoun's contemporary doctrine was presented as one of limitation within American democracy to prevent traditional tyranny, whether actual or imagined.[14]
Federalist No. 10 "The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection" (November 23, 1787):[15]
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed...By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.
With respect to American democracy, Tocqueville, in his book Democracy in America, says:
Robert A. Dahl argues that the tyranny of the majority is a spurious dilemma (p. 171):[16]
Regarding recent American politics (specifically initiatives), Donovan et al. argue that:
The notion that, in a democracy, the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannise and exploit diverse smaller interests, has been criticised by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action, who argues instead that narrow and well organised minorities are more likely to assert their interests over those of the majority. Olson argues that when the benefits of political action (e.g., lobbying) are spread over fewer agents, there is a stronger individual incentive to contribute to that political activity. Narrow groups, especially those who can reward active participation to their group goals, might therefore be able to dominate or distort political process, a process studied in public choice theory.
Class studies
Tyranny of the majority has also been prevalent in some class studies. Rahim Baizidi uses the concept of "democratic suppression" to analyze the tyranny of the majority in economic classes. According to this, the majority of the upper and middle classes, together with a small portion of the lower class, form the majority coalition of conservative forces in the society.[17]
Anti-federalists of public choice theory point out that vote trading can protect minority interests from majorities in representative democratic bodies such as legislatures. They continue that direct democracy, such as statewide propositions on ballots, does not offer such protections.