| Litigants: | Memoirs v. Massachusetts |
| Arguedatea: | December 7 |
| Arguedateb: | 8 |
| Argueyear: | 1965 |
| Decidedate: | March 21 |
| Decideyear: | 1966 |
| Fullname: | A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure", et al. v. Attorney General of Massachusetts |
| Usvol: | 383 |
| Uspage: | 413 |
| Parallelcitations: | 86 S. Ct. 975; 16 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2906; 1 Media L. Rep. 1390 |
| Holding: | Since the First Amendment forbids censorship of expression of ideas not linked with illegal action, Fanny Hill cannot be proscribed. |
| Plurality: | Brennan |
| Joinplurality: | Warren, Fortas |
| Concurrence: | Black |
| Joinconcurrence: | Stewart |
| Concurrence2: | Douglas |
| Dissent: | Clark |
| Dissent2: | Harlan |
| Dissent3: | White |
| Lawsapplied: | U.S. Const. amend. I |
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), was the United States Supreme Court decision that attempted to clarify a holding regarding obscenity made a decade earlier in Roth v. United States (1957).
The Roth ruling established that for a work of literature to be considered obscene, it had to be proven by censors to: 1) appeal to prurient interest, 2) be patently offensive, and 3) have no redeeming social value. The literature in Roth v. United States was Fanny Hill (or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, 1749) by John Cleland and the Court held in Memoirs v. Massachusetts that, while it might fit the first two criteria (it appealed to prurient interest and was patently offensive), it could not be proven that Fanny Hill had no redeeming social value. The judgment favoring the plaintiff continued that it could still be held obscene under certain circumstances for instance, if it were marketed solely for its prurient appeal.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts led to more years of debate about what is and is not obscene, eventually conferring more power in these matters to proposers of local community standards.