Cognitive warfare explained

Cognitive warfare (CW) consists of any military activities, conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power, to affect attitudes and behaviours, by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual, group, or population level cognition, to gain an advantage over an adversary.[1] It is an extension of form of information warfare using propaganda and disinformation.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) General Paolo Ruggiero distinguishes it from other information-related activities by its objectives: "Its goal is not what individuals think, but rather, the way they think."[2] Cognitive warfare refers to the way that human thought, reasoning, sense-making, decision-making, and behaviour may be engineered through not only the manipulation of information, but also by the A.I./ML network of algorithms which push information through the internet. Other methods of Cognitive Warfare include the targeted use of inaudible sound waves (frequency of <20 Hz) and microwaves to incapacitate enemy forces by disrupting the neurological functions of human targets without causing visible injury.[3] [4] [5] According to the U.S. National Institute of Health, Infrasound’s effect on the human inner ear includes “vertigo, imbalance, intolerable sensations, incapacitation, disorientation, nausea, vomiting, and bowel spasm; and resonances in inner organs, such as the heart."

Comparison of cognitive warfare with information warfare

According to Masakowski, cognitive warfare is an extension of information warfare (IW). Operations in the information environment are traditionally conducted in five core capabilities - electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOPs), military deception (MILDEC), operational security (OPSEC), and computer network operations (CNO).[6] Information warfare aims at controlling the flow of information in support of traditional military objectives, mainly to produce lethal effects on the battlefield. According to Masakowski & NATO Gen Ruggiero, cognitive warfare degrades the capacity to know and produce foreknowledge, transforming the understanding and interpretations of situations by individuals and in the mass consciousness, and has multiple agnostic applications including commercial, political and covert IW and CW military operations. The Chinese military refers to operations in the cognitive domain as 'cognitive domain operations (CDO)'.[7]

Cognitive warfare and data

Using a psychological and psychographic profile, an influence campaign can be created and adjusted in real time by A.I. ML models until desired cognitive and behaviour affects on the individual and/or population are achieved.[8] U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency strategy calls for the use of automated biometric systems to separate insurgents and foreign fighters from the general population.[9] In doing so, this helps counterinsurgents leverage the population and operational environment against the threat network.

Decades of peer-reviewed research show that echo chambers, in the physical world and online, cause political polarization,[10] extremism, confusion, cognitive dissonance, negative emotional responses (e.g. anger and fear), reactance, microaggressions, and third-person effects.[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]

And because of these psychological perseverance mechanisms like confirmation bias, this can be very problematic based on the work of Nyhan & Reifler (2010). Nyhan & Reifler found that even attempting to correct false beliefs often reinforces rather than dispels these beliefs among those who hold them most strongly. This is known as the backfire effect – "in which corrections actually increase misperceptions."[23] [24] [25] [26]

Objectives and downstream effects

According to Masakowski, the objectives of cognitive warfare are to shape/control and enemy's cognitive thinking and decision-making; to manipulate and degrade a nation's values, emotions, national spirit, cultural traditions, historical beliefs, political will; to achieve adversarial strategic geopolitical objectives without fighting; to influence human/societal reasoning, thinking, emotions, et al. aligned with specific objectives; and degrade a populations trust in their institutions.[27] In doing so, Masakowski claims that this allows for the weakening/distruption of military, political & societal cohesion; and undermining/threatening of democracy. Masakowski alleges that cognitive warfare has also been used by authoritarian societies to restructure society and groom populations to accept "continuous surveillance" and that this allows these authoritarian societies to "remove individuals/outliers who resist and insist on freedom of speech, independent thinking, etc."

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Cognitive Warfare . NATO's Strategic Warfare Development Command.
  2. Web site: "#RigaStratComDialogue Strategy Talk by NATO General Paolo Ruggiero" . .
  3. Web site: November 2001 . Infrasound: Brief Review of Toxicological Literature . https://web.archive.org/web/20240328173403/https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/sites/default/files/ntp/htdocs/chem_background/exsumpdf/infrasound_508.pdf . U.S. National Institute of Health. March 28, 2024 .
  4. Web site: Mizokami . Kyle . 25 September 2019 . So What Is This Secretive Chinese Sonic Weapon Exactly? . Popular Mechanics.
  5. Web site: NATO Commander Grostad . NATO CyCon 2022 DAY 3 Panel: Cognitive Warfare – Hacking the OODA Loop . . July 13, 2022 .
  6. Wilson, Clay, 'Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues', LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2007 Mar 20
  7. Web site: Baughman . Josh . How China Wins the Cognitive Domain .
  8. Web site: "Target Audience Analysis" – Joint Warfare Center .
  9. Web site: Field Manual 3-24 INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES (MCWP 3-33.5) .
  10. Bail . Christopher A. . Argyle . Lisa P. . Brown . Taylor W. . Bumpus . John P. . Chen . Haohan . Hunzaker . M. B. Fallin . Lee . Jaemin . Mann . Marcus . Merhout . Friedolin . Volfovsky . Alexander . September 11, 2018 . "Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization" . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences . 115 . 37 . 9216–9221 . 10.1073/pnas.1804840115 . 30154168 . free. 6140520 . 2018PNAS..115.9216B .
  11. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government" | By: Achen CH, Bartels LM | Princeton Univ Press, Princeton | 2016
  12. "Public Opinion and Policy in the American States" | By: Erikson RS, Wright GC, McIver JP | Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK | 1993
  13. "When  the People  Speak:  Deliberative Democracy  and  Public Consultation" | By: Fishkin  JS | Oxford University Press, Oxford | 2011
  14. "A   new  era   of   minimal  effects?   The   changing foundations of political communication" | J Commun 58:707–731 | By: Bennett   WL,  Iyengar   S | 2008
  15. Sunstein C (2002) Republic.com (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton)
  16. "The political blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. election: Divided they blog" | By: Adamic, L., & Glance, N. | 2005, August 21 | Paper presented at the 3th International Workshop on Link Discovery (pp. 36–43), Chicago, IL. New York, NY: ACM
  17. Wollebæk . Dag . Karlsen . Rune . Steen-Johnsen . Kari . Enjolras . Bernard . April 2019 . Anger, Fear, and Echo Chambers: The Emotional Basis for Online Behavior . Social Media + Society . 5 . 2 . 10.1177/2056305119829859. 11250/2597058 . free .
  18. "Mapping social dynamics on Facebook: The Brexit debate" | By: Del Vicario, M., Zollo, F., Caldarelli, G., Scala, A., & Quattrociocchi, W. | 2017 | 'Social Networks,' 50, 6–16.
  19. "The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you" | By: Pariser, E. | 2011 | New York, NY: Penguin Press
  20. Web site: "The Law of Group Polarization" By: Cass R. Sunstein John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 91, 1999 .
  21. Web site: "Unintended Effects of Public Relations in Strategic Communication: A First Synthesis" By: Jie Xu 'Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal', 2019, Vol 20, p1 ISSN: 1440-4389 .
  22. Villanova University, USA . Xu . Jie . 2020 . Unintended Effects of Advertising: An Updated Qualitative Review . Review of Communication Research . 8 . 1–16 . 10.12840/ISSN.2255-4165.021. November 1, 2024 . free .
  23. Web site: "When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions" By: Nyhan Brendan, Reifler Jason 2010 Political Behavior 32:303–30 . 10.1177/2378023116689791 .
  24. Web site: "The Backfire Effect" By: Matthew Wills April 3, 2017 . April 3, 2017 .
  25. "A dissonance analysis of the boomerang effect" | By: Cohen, Arthur R. | March 1962 | 'Journal of Personality' 30 (1): 75–88 | Doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1962.tb02306.x. | PMID 13880221
  26. Web site: Silverman, Craig (June 17, 2011). "The Backfire Effect: More on the press's inability to debunk bad information". Columbia Journalism Review, Columbia University (New York City) .
  27. Web site: Masakowski . Yvonne, PhD. . Newport Lecture Series: "Artificial Intelligence & Cognitive Warfare" with Yvonne Masakowski . . April 11, 2022 .