54th Ohio Infantry Regiment explained

The 54th Ohio Infantry Regiment was an infantry regiment in the Union Army during the American Civil War. They wore Zouave uniforms that were identical to those of the 34th Ohio Infantry Regiment (Piatts Zouaves.)

Service

The 54th Ohio Infantry Regiment was organized at Camp Dennison near Cincinnati, Ohio, in October 1861 and mustered in for three years service under the command of Colonel Thomas Kilby Smith as a Zouave regiment. The regiment was recruited in Allen, Auglaize, Champaign, Clinton, Cuyahoga, Fayette, Greene, Highland, Lake, Logan, Morgan, and Preble counties.

While Col. Smith and his staff were still training the regimen, an army led by Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant won two battles that were the most significant Union victories, at that time, of the American Civil War, the battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers respectively. These victories shut off the rivers to the Confederacy as transportation routes, and opened the way to restore federal authority at Nashville, an ironworks center, a major producer of gunpowder, a major supply depot, a major agricultural crop collection point, and a converging point for railroads. The Department of the Missouri's commander, Maj. Gen. Hallek had three field armies under his command now, (now Maj. Gen. Grant's Army of the Tennessee (AoT), Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio (AoO), and Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of the Mississippi (AoM). In mid-February, he sent Pope's AoM to reduce the threat on the Mississippi by attacking Island Number 10. He had Grant's AoT continue its movement up the Tennessee River into Confederate territory where his troops arrived at the Tennessee River town of Savannah, TN, on March 11. Within a week, a significant force was there and at landings further south. Meanwhile, Buell's AoO had gone up the Cumberland River and taken Nashville and was moving southwest to join Grant on the Tennessee.

The Confederacy's defeats Fort Henry and Donelson made it abandon Kentucky and parts of Tennessee. Their last troops in Nashville left on February 23. Their Western Theater commander, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, made the controversial decision to quit the region, and despite political unhappiness in Richmond, his consolidation of troops further south precluded being could cut off in Kentucky and major portions of Tennessee. He planned to consolidate forces in Corinth, MS just over the state line. By the end of March, Johnston had over 40,000 Confederate troops at Corinth.

Realizing that his troops were too spread out, the theater commander, Maj. Gen. Hallek decided to concentrate troops at Pittsburg Landing,9miles upriver (south) of Savannah, where the armies could advance on a good road to Corinth, Mississippi. The town was a junction of two vital railroad lines, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad (M&ORR) and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad (M&CRR), called by some "the vertebrae of the Confederacy." Halleck argued Richmond and Corinth were the great strategic points of the war, and all efforts should be made to take Corinth and thereby make rebel control of railroads west of the East Tennessee bastion of Chattanooga meaningless.

Shiloh

See main article: Battle of Shiloh. On Monday, February 17, 1862, the 850 men of the 54th Ohio Zouaves left Cincinnati via the Ohio River and sailed downriver reaching Paducah, KY, three days later, February 20. There, Col. Smith and his regiment were assigned to Col Stuart's 2nd Brigade in Brig. Gen. Sherman's 5th Division. Two weeks later, March 6, the 54th Ohio boarded river steamers and sailed up the Tennessee River. After joining the AoT at Savannah from Wednesday through Friday, March 12-14, the 54th and its division disembarked at Pittsburg Landing Monday, March 17. After organizing itself at the landing, Sherman's division marched west 3miles, and camped near Shiloh Church. The men noted the army's position was somewhat shaped like a triangle, with the sides formed by various creeks and the river. The land was mostly wooded, with scattered cotton fields, peach orchards, and a few small structures. They camped with their brigade to the east and left of the main Corinth road. The 54th as part of Stuart's brigade shifted camp closer on Wednesday nearly 2miles closer to the Tennessee at Bell Field at the junction of the Savannah and Hamburg roads to guard the ford over Lick Creek.The regiment spent the next fortnight in camp training, drilling, preparing for the expected advance, and patrolling south in the woods towards Corinth.

In between the 54th Ohio and Sherman's three other brigades was Brig. Gen Prentiss' 6th Division, and between the Shiloh Church area and the river were Maj. Gen. McClernand's 1st Division and Brig. Gen. Hurlbut's 4th Division. Behind the 54th Ohio in Stuart's brigade and closest to the landing was Brig. Gen. W.H.L. Wallace's 2nd Division.

The Union plan was to combine Grant's and Buell's armies and continue south and capture Corinth, which would be a springboard to take Memphis, Vicksburg, and large portions of Confederate territory. While most of the AoT was near Pittsburg Landing in early April, one division was 5miles downstream (north) at Crump's Landing, and the army headquarters remained further north in Savannah. Buell's army was on the way from Nashville to Savannah. Hallek ordered Grant to avoid an engagement until "properly fortified" and ordered to do so. Wet weather meanwhile was hampering Grant's efforts to keep his artillery and supplies with his infantry as the roads were in terrible condition.

Johnston realized he could soon be outnumbered with 42,000 men at Corinth, and 15,000 more on the way, while the not–yet–combined Union force could number 75,000 men. Seizing the initiative, Johnston decided to surprise Grant on April 4 before Buell arrived from Nashville. Inexperience and bad weather caused the 20miles march north to take longer than he expected, and his troops were not in position until Saturday afternoon, April 5. On Friday, April 4, pickets under Col. Ralph P. Buckland made contact with some of Johnston's cavalry who drove them back to about a 1.5miles in advance of his center, on the 54th Ohio's right on the main Corinth road. Sherman sent his cavalry at them in pursuit driving them back about 5miles. The cavalry did not see the rest of Johnston's army, and Sherman and Grant were not concerned by their presence, with Sherman writing, "yet I did not believe that he designed anything but a strong demonstration." This may have been fueled by lack of contact by other patrols such as the six companies Stuart sent out on the Hamburg road, with a squadron of cavalry sent forward by General McClernand, to reconnoiter beyond Hamburg on Saturday.

The Confederates spent Saturday night, April 5 in the woods south of the Union campsites. Johnston's plan was to attack the Union left, pushing it northwest against the swampy land adjacent to Snake and Owl creeks. Confederate troops along the Tennessee River would prevent Union reinforcements and resupply. Despite the cavalry skirmish on Friday, the AoT did not expect a fight at that location and did not form a defensive line nor make any entrenchments. Sherman dismissed the April 4 contact as a reconnaissance. Grant had ordered all his commanders to be careful to avoid a battle before Buell arrived. Further sightings and incidents throughout Saturday were likewise dismissed. After hearing of sightings of Confederates at Seay Field, Col. Everett Peabody, commanding Prentiss' 1st Brigade, grew concerned, and around midnight Saturday, sent a five company patrol to investigate. Prentiss was not informed, and the patrol advanced from their camp on the 54th Ohio's right southwest down a farm road leading to Pittsburg-Corinth Road.

First Day's Battle

Around 5:00a.m., Sunday, April 6, Confederate pickets from a battalion in Brig. Gen. Wood's 3rd Brigade of Maj. Gen. Hardee's 3rd Corps